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INTRODUCTION
It would be an Orwellian nightmare if one day we were to wake up
and a single person decided which news stories were covered or how
they were covered—in essence, if news stations colluded on their
content. Every day in Honolulu, Hawaii, two stations simulcast their
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morning and evening news broadcasts.1 In San Angelo, Texas;2
Denver, Colorado; and Charleston, South Carolina, different on-air
personalities read the same script across competing stations.3 In
Chicago, an editor coordinates the sharing of journalists, crews, and
editorial staff of CBS, NBC, FOX, and CW to limit duplicative costs.4
These are among the many examples of collusion in broadcast
television news.5 The nightmare is here.
Broadcast television firms have created various agreements of
questionable antitrust legality to increase efficiency and profitability.6
One example, known as a shared service agreement (SSA),
coordinates the sharing of services and facilities between firms and
inhibits quality-based competition between stations.7
Although antitrust laws cover almost all anticompetive activities,
the agencies charged with enforcing the laws rarely pursue
agreements on quality.8 This lax enforcement probably stems from
the difficulties of measuring quality and the procompetitive effects of
standardization.9 For some industries, such as local broadcast
television news (LBTN), the justifications for ignoring quality
collusion appear nonexistent.10 Moreover, the quality reductions in
broadcast television offend one of our society’s cherished tenets: the

1. See Danilo Yanich, Local TV News & Service Agreements: A Critical Look,
UNIV. DEL., 8 (Oct. 2011), http://www.udel.edu/ocm/pdf/DYanichSSAFINALReport102411.pdf.
2. See Brian Stelter, You Can Change the Channel, but Local News Is the Same,
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2012, at A1.
3. Charleston, SC, FREEPRESS, http://www.freepress.net/ changethechannels#!/
markets/97590/charleston-sc (last visited Nov. 12, 2012). Agreements between
stations exist in at least eighty-three television markets, covering 55% of American
television households. Yanich, supra note 1, at 7. The agreements can be very
influential. For example, in Denver, 71% of the stories, broadcast by two stations,
are the same, and of those, 67% use the same video, 62% use the same script, 39%
have the same reporter, and 11% have the same on-air personality. Id. at 26-27.
4. Chicago, IL, FREEPRESS, http://www.freepress.net/ changethechannels#!/
markets/769/chicago-il (last visited Nov. 12, 2012).
5. See generally Yanich, supra note 1.
6. See, e.g., Honolulu Stations in Shared Services Deal, TVNEWSCHECK (Aug.
18, 2009, 6:20 PM), http://www.tvnewscheck.com/article/2009/08/18/34810/honolulustations-in-shared-services-deal.
7. See Christopher S. Reed, Regulating Relationships Between Competing
Broadcasters, 33 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 5-7 (2010).
8. See infra Part II.B.
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See infra Part II.B.
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freedom of the press.11 Accordingly, the collusive agreements are
worthy of closer scrutiny.
This Note discusses quality-based collusion in three parts. Part I
provides a background of the legal treatment and economic theory
regarding quality collusion and how economic principles apply to
broadcast television. Part II discusses the divergence between the
antitrust laws as written and antitrust laws as enforced against quality
collusion. Part III provides strategies the antitrust community (the
Community)12 could adopt to enforce the laws more effectively, with
local broadcast television as a backdrop for applying the strategies.
I. BACKGROUND OF ANTITRUST LAW AND THE MEDIA
Antitrust law has a long history extending back to 50 B.C. when the
Lex Julia de Annona prevented the people from rigging Rome’s corn
market.13 In the United States, the statutory history began with the
passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (Sherman Act).14
While the debate over the purpose of antitrust law persists,15 courts
and enforcement agencies lean heavily on economic theory in
interpreting the statutes.16

11. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1; Curtis Publ’g. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 149
(1967) (noting that freedom of the press is a “social necessity” required to maintain
our political system (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967))).
12. The antitrust community includes the state and federal legislatures that write
the antitrust statutes; the federal and state judiciary that decide antitrust cases; the
federal agencies charged with enforcing the federal antitrust statutes (namely the
Federal Trade Commission (Commission) and the Department of Justice Antitrust
Division (Division)); the state attorneys general that are charged with enforcing state
antitrust statutes; the private legal professionals that bring and defend antitrust
actions; and legal scholars of antitrust law.
13. See Michael Albery, Restrictive Trade Practices and the Conflict of Law, 44
PROBS. PUB. & PRIVATE INT’L L. 125, 130 (1958).
14. See Andrew C. Hruska, A Broad Market Approach to Antitrust Product
Market Definition in Innovative Industries, 102 YALE L.J. 305, 306–07 (1992).
15. Legal commentators, such as Robert Bork (ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 39–44 (1978)) and Richard Posner
(RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 9–32 (2d ed. 2001)), have asserted that the
purpose of antitrust law is economic, while others claim that it is to benefit
consumers. See John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of
Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
191, 196 (2008) (challenging such assertions).
16. For example, in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
509 U.S. 209, 233 (1993) and in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589–90 (1986), the Court accepted economic
commentators’ consensus that predatory pricing is rarely successful. In contrast with
those cases, in FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the D.C. Circuit
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A. Antitrust Law and the Legal Treatment of Collusion
While a complete discussion of U.S. antitrust law and policy
exceeds the scope of this Note, this Section provides a general
background on antitrust law, the parties involved, and how antitrust
laws relate to quality collusion. The bulk of antitrust law flows from
two broadly written statutes: the Sherman Act17 and Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914.18 The laws are enforced by
the Federal Trade Commission (Commission) and the Department of
Justice Antitrust Division (Division) (collectively, the Agencies),
although private parties can also bring antitrust claims.19 The
Agencies and courts will flesh out the statutes with economic
frameworks, key definitions, and procedural rules,20 though
occasionally they make mistakes.21
The Sherman Act established the initial framework for antitrust
regulation in the United States.22 The key sections are: § 1 (“Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal . . . .”)23;
and § 2 (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony . . . .”).24 The statute does not specify a particular type of

held that efficiencies would have to be “extraordinary” to defend an otherwise
anticompetitive merger, and in that case the efficiencies were insufficient to counter
the merger’s anticompetitive effects. See also FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066,
1088–89 (D.D.C. 1997). Generally, the outcome of increasing economic efficiencies
and protecting consumers are the same. See Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 15, at
240.
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58.
19. Robert P. Taylor & Roxane C. Busey, Relationships Among Competitors, in
ANTITRUST INSTITUTE 2012: DEVELOPMENTS & HOT TOPICS, VOLUME ONE 131, 155,
162 (2012).
20. See, e.g., Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 600 (1898).
21. See, e.g., United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377
(1956).
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 1.
23. Id.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)
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restraint.25 The core restriction came shortly after the passage of the
Sherman Act: the Supreme Court, in Hopkins v. United States,
narrowed “[e]very restraint” to mean only unreasonable restraints.26
To determine whether firms are unreasonably restricting trade, courts
categorize the behavior.27 Multi-firm behavior, which is the focus of
this Note, has several categories, including horizontal agreements,28
vertical agreements,29 and mergers. Each of those categories has subcategories. For example, horizontal agreements include group
boycotts, price fixing, market allocations, information exchanges, and
joint ventures.30
The cost of antitrust litigation31 makes prosecutorial discretion an
important consideration for firms.
To help the Community
understand, the Agencies jointly promulgate guidelines articulating
the framework the Agencies use to determine whether to bring suit.32

25. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2. Firms can theoretically restrict price, quality,
or quantity in their dealings with other firms or customers. See infra Part I.B.
26. Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 600 (1898) (“The act of congress must
have a reasonable construction, or else there would scarcely be an agreement or
contract among businessmen that could not be said to have, indirectly or remotely,
some bearing on interstate commerce . . . .”). Even the most basic service contract
that sets out a future performance, such as painting a home, restrains trade by
eliminating future competition for the job. A painter would be unwilling to take on
the job without a contract to ensure payment. As a result, the contract is a
reasonable restraint of trade. In comparison, an agreement between competitors that
rigs an auction to obtain higher prices serves no legitimate purpose and is
unreasonable. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 87–88 (1911).
27. See Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in
Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1207 (2008).
28. A horizontal agreement is “[a]n agreement entered into between competing
producers or dealers whereby they seek to control the market price of a commodity.”
BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010).
29. A vertical agreement is an agreement entered into between non-competing
producers or dealers. See Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 722
(1988).
30. See Taylor et al., supra note 19, at 11, 13.
31. See, e.g., Iroquois Gas Transmission Sys., L.P. v. F.E.R.C., 145 F.3d 398, 399
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (charging the Iroquois more than $15,000,000 in legal fees); In re
Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503, 522–25 (E.D.N.Y.
2003) (plaintiff’s legal fees, based on lodestar, were more than $60,000,000 in addition
to almost $19,000,000 in costs and fees); In re NASDAQ Mkt.-Makers Antitrust
Litig., 187 F.R.D. 465, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees totaled
$143,780,000).
32. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS (2000); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC,
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(Aug.
19,
2010),
available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf
[hereinafter
2010
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES].
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Written by antitrust professionals, the guidelines take into account
economic theory as it develops and data gleaned from the Agencies’
experiences in enforcement.33 The Agencies update the guidelines
regularly to remain current with economic theory and antitrust
practice.34 Adding to the guidelines’ weight, courts also rely on the
publications to understand and apply economic principles.35
To limit the cost of antitrust litigation,36 courts match the depth of
their query, based on these categories and subcategories, to the
likelihood that a particular restraint on trade is unreasonable.37 The
more likely it is that an activity is anticompetitive, the less time a
court spends considering the reasonableness of the particular
restraint.38 The scheme uses a rough tripartite categorization: rule of
reason (ROR),39 per se,40 and quick look.41
The “rule of reason” is the deepest, most common, and costly
antitrust analysis.42 Under the ROR, the court considers a variety of
factors, including information about the business, the condition of the
business before and after the restraint was imposed, the nature of the
restraint, and the effect of the restraint on other businesses to
determine whether the conduct in question is reasonable or not.43
While the ROR allows defendants to use many different factors, they
may not claim that competition itself is unreasonable,44 although
33. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice,
Issue Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Aug. 19, 2010) (on file with author).
34. The Merger Guidelines have undergone five major revisions since 1982, while
the bulk of U.S. Supreme Court case law and statutes predate 1982. See Carl Shapiro,
The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77
ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 92 (2010).
35. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1992,
rev. 1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf
[hereinafter 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES] (S.S.N.I.P. test to define
relevant market in a tying case); see also United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F.
Supp. 2d 322, 335–36 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (applying the 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES).
36. The oppressive costs of antitrust litigation were one of the driving forces
behind the now seminal case of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. See 550 U.S. 544,
558–59 (2007).
37. See infra notes 32–62 and accompanying text.
38. Compare infra notes 42–47 and accompanying text, with infra notes 48–51 and
accompanying text.
39. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
40. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
41. Taylor & Busey, supra note 19, at 205–11.
42. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 27, at 1214–15.
43. See, e.g., Khan, 522 U.S. at 10.
44. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978).
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restraints designed to enhance social welfare can be reasonable.45
Given the complexity of the case theory, parties on both sides enlist
economists and industry experts to develop models and claim that
“reasonableness” weighs in their favor.46 In the end, case ambiguities
and complexities overwhelm the party with the burden of proof.47
“Per se” is an unforgiving antitrust analysis reserved for activities
that, in the judiciary’s experience, have lacked a legitimate business
purpose.48 As the Court explained in Jefferson Parish Hospital
District No. 2 v. Hyde, the rationale for per se is to “avoid a
burdensome inquiry into actual market conditions in situations where
the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct . . . render[s] unjustifiable
the costs of determining whether the particular case at bar involves
anticompetitive conduct.”49 When an activity is per se illegal, the
plaintiff need not prove an anticompetitive intent or effect.50 The
primary per se illegal activities are price fixing, division of markets,
and group boycotts.51
To wade deeper into the murky waters of antitrust litigation than
per se allows, without the full ROR analysis, the Court recently
established a “quick look” analysis.52
The quick look is an
intermediate inquiry. It applies when someone with a “rudimentary
understanding of economics” could determine that the alleged
activity would have anticompetitive effects.53 Under this type of
analysis, defendants can demonstrate procompetitive economic
justifications for their facially anticompetitive behavior to establish
the restraint’s reasonableness.54 If the defendant fails, the conduct is

45. See, e.g., FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997) (using experts
to break down cost differentials in submarkets with and without competition).
46. See generally United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377
(1956); Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. at 1066.
47. Edward Brunet & David J. Sweeney, Antitrust Procedure and Substance
After Northwest Wholesale Stationers: Evolving Antitrust Approaches to Pleadings,
Burden of Proof, and Boycotts, 72 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1018 (1986).
48. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
49. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 n.25 (1984) (citing
Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 350–51 (1982)).
50. See id. at 33 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
51. See N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5 (internal citations omitted).
52. The Supreme Court alluded to the idea of a “quick look” analysis in NCAA v.
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984), although it
went unnamed until California Dental Association v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769 (1999).
53. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 770.
54. See generally id.; Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 110.
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illegal.55 Although it has yet to happen, if the defendant meets the
burden, the court will probably adjudicate under the ROR.56
To tease apart “quick look” and per se, consider collegiate
football57: a functioning football league requires participating colleges
to agree on various aspects of game play, player recruitment, and
player compensation to function as an amateur league. Each of these
is a horizontal agreement, but they are also legal.58 In the early 1980s,
the NCAA fixed the price and quantity at which they sold television
rights to stations among participating schools.59 Because collegiate
sports require certain agreements, the Court utilized the quick look
standard, rather than a stricter per se analysis.60 Because some
agreement was necessary, the Court allowed the NCAA to rebut a
presumption of illegality with evidence of the restraint’s
reasonableness.61
Although the NCAA proposed various
justifications for the restraint’s reasonableness, such as ensuring
stadium attendance by limiting the supply of televised football and
the non-profit status of the NCAA, the Court determined that the
NCAA’s restraint was illegal.62
Antitrust violations have several affirmative defenses, two of which
are especially relevant to multi-firm conduct: efficiency63 and a failing
company.64 The efficiency defense asserts that the efficiencies that an
otherwise illegal restraint creates are so great that the restraint is
reasonable65 while the failing company defense claims that the
continued existence of one or both of the firms is economically

55. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 27, at 1215.
56. See id.
57. Lewis Cole, The NCAA: Mass Culture as Big Business, 8 CHANGE 8, 42
(1976).
58. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101.
59. See id. at 91-93.
60. See id. at 100-01.
61. See id. at 117.
62. See id. at 120.
63. See generally 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32; Jamie
Henikoff Moffitt, Merging in the Shadow of the Law: The Case for Consistent
Judicial Efficiency Analysis, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1697, 1700 (2010). Contra Kirkwood
& Lande, supra note 15, at 191 (arguing that the goal is to protect consumers).
64. See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 506–08 (1974);
Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969); United States v. Third
Nat’l Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. 171, 182 (1968).
65. See generally FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001); FTC v.
Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
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unfeasible without an otherwise illegal merger.66 In asserting any
defense, regardless of its grounds, firms cannot assert that the
competition itself is unreasonable, thereby justifying the restraint.67
The Commission, Division, and district courts accept efficiency
claims to justify otherwise anticompetitive behavior if the gains in
efficiency outweigh the loss in competition.68 Currently, the efficiency
defense is in question, as higher courts have placed the bar so high
that it is nearly impossible to overcome.69
The Commission
challenged Procter & Gamble’s proposed acquisition of Clorox in
1967.70 The United States Supreme Court discounted the possibility
of an efficiency defense, stating in dicta, “Possible economies cannot
be used as a defense to illegality. Congress was aware that some
mergers which lessen competition may also result in economies but it
struck the balance in favor of protecting competition.”71 More than
thirty years later, in 2001, the Commission challenged a merger
between Heinz and Milnot Holding Corporation.72 In that case, the
D.C. Circuit acknowledged that lower courts had allowed efficiency
defenses; however, the court went on to explain that the lower courts
also usually found the efficiencies inadequate to overcome antitrust
implications.73 The court ultimately held that the efficiencies would
have to be “extraordinary” in order to justify presumptively
anticompetitive behavior.74 Accordingly, the efficiencies in that case
were insufficient.75 Thus it is questionable whether efficiencies are a
legitimate defense; the Supreme Court has not reconsidered its
position since rejecting the defense in 1967.76
Cases involving the news have similar holdings.77 In the 1960s,
newspapers entered into joint operating agreements to increase
efficiency by consolidating most newspaper operations—except for
66. See, e.g., Citizen Publ’g Co., 394 U.S. at 138.
67. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978) (citing
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 284 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d as
modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)).
68. See, e.g., 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32.
69. See infra notes 70–76 and accompanying text.
70. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 569-70 (1967).
71. Id. at 580.
72. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 711–13 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (challenging a
duopoly to monopoly merger between baby food manufacturers).
73. Id. at 720.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 721.
76. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
77. See infra notes 78–91 and accompanying text.
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the editorial and news departments.78 The Division brought suit
against the publisher of Tucson’s only evening newspaper and the
publisher of the city’s only morning and Sunday newspaper who
formed an agreement that placed both papers under the control of a
single entity.79 The new firm, which the two original publishers
controlled equally, managed all aspects of publishing, except for the
editorial boards.80 The Supreme Court deemed the joint operating
agreement illegal under the Sherman Act.81 Anxious over a declining
newspaper industry with an eye towards preserving competing
editorial voices, Congress passed the Newspaper Preservation Act of
1970, which effectively overturned Citizen Publishing.82 The Act
provides merging newspapers with limited antitrust immunity, subject
to review by the Division—so long as the editorial boards remain
independent.83
Another development from Citizen Publishing was the
modernization of the failing company defense.84
The Court
rationalized that the inevitable loss to competition combined with
other losses resulting from the failing firm’s cessation could
sometimes negate the immediate impact that the merger has on
competition.85
The defense allows firms to merge despite
anticompetitive impacts, on the principle that it is the lesser of two
evils.86 To prevail on a failing company defense, the defendant must
prove three points87: (1) that the company’s “resources [are] so
depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so remote that it faced the
grave probability of a business failure;”88 (2) that the acquiring firm is
the only available purchaser;89 and (3) that a successful reorganization

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See, e.g., Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 133 (1969).
See id. at 134.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 135-36.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1801–04 (1970); see Mark Fink, Comment, The Newspaper
Preservation Act of 1970: Help for the Needy or the Greedy?, 1990 DET. C.L. REV.
93, 105–06.
83. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801–04.
84. See 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
85. Id. at 136–37.
86. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 507–08 (1974).
87. See Citizen Publ’g Co., 394 U.S. at 138–39.
88. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. at 507 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S.
291 (1961)).
89. Citizen Publ’g Co., 394 U.S. at 138–39.
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through bankruptcy is unlikely.90 Taken as a whole, the burden is
difficult to overcome.91
Despite the judiciary’s desire to achieve the proper outcome as
indicated by the intricacies of the case law, the United States
Supreme Court and lower courts have a difficult time adjudicating
antitrust actions.92 The combined complexities of the economic
principles, the sophisticated evidence, and the breadth of the statutes
all contribute to the courts’ difficulties. For example, in United States
v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,93 the United States Supreme
Court found that du Pont de Nemours & Co. could not raise the price
of cellophane without losing a substantial market share to alternative
packaging materials.94 Based on that factual finding, the Court
decided that the firm did not have monopoly power, precluding it
from monopolizing the market.95 The Court erred, however, in
assuming that because a firm cannot raise its price any more, the firm
is not charging a monopoly price already. Even monopolies face
reductions in demand when they increase prices.96
In antitrust cases, where the harm is purely economic, it is only
logical that plaintiffs use economic theory in determining their
litigation strategy, considering the probability and value of success
against the costs of litigating.97 For example, a per se illegal case of
price fixing will need minimal expert testimony, while a challenge of

90. Id.
91. See Thomas D. Fina & Vishal Mehta, The Failing Firm Defense: Alive and
Well, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2011, available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/aug11_fina_7_26f.authcheckdam.pdf.
92. Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust, 52 B.C.
L. REV. 871, 877 (2011).
93. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
94. Id. at 400.
95. Id. at 404.
96. See id.
97. Generally the Agencies utilize their prosecutorial discretion to maximize
economic efficiency based on economic principles. See Spencer Weber Waller,
Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR.
L. REV. 1383, 1401–05 (1998). Both the Commission and the Division have finite
budgets. The Commission’s Bureau of Competition 2011 budget was $125,260,000.
See FTC, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION FISCAL YEAR 2012 CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET JUSTIFICATION SUMMARY (2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
ftc/oed/fmo/budgetsummary12.pdf. The 2011 Division budget was $163,200,000.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION 2012 BUDGET SUMMARY (2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2012summary/pdf/fy12-atr-bud-summary.pdf.
Private
parties also feel the sting of the cost of antitrust litigation. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546 (2007).
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quality fixing would require market analysis, research, and economic
experts to testify regarding the reasonableness of the restraint.98 As a
result, the Commission and Division are justifiably hesitant to bring
enforcement actions against quality collusion.99
Because this Note uses broadcast television as a lens, it is
important to acknowledge that the Federal Communication
Commission’s (FCC’s) enforcement authority runs tangentially to
that of the Division and Commission.100 The FCC’s mandate is to
ensure that television stations “serve the public interest, convenience,
and necessity.”101 To that end, the FCC seeks to promote diversity,
competition, and localism.102
Recently the FCC relaxed local
television market ownership rules, allowing a single entity to control
two stations in a single market if there are eight independent stations
in the market and at least one of the stations is not one of the top four
in that market group.103 These guidelines, however, are not binding
on the Commission or the Division.104
B.

The Economic Effects of Collusion

In response to the expansive statutory breadth, defendants turned
to economic theory105 to narrow the scope of the statutes.106

98. Because there have been very few claims brought based on quality collusion
in the past ten years and none have been successful, calculating the chance of success
would be extremely speculative. See infra Part II.B.
99. See, e.g., BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FTC, A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION’S
DIVESTITURE PROCESS (1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/08/
divestiture.pdf; Dr. Joseph Farrell, Remarks at the Antitrust Law Section Fall Forum
2011, Upward Price Pressure, Market Definition and Supply Mobility (Oct. 28, 2011)
(on file with author).
100. See generally 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–62 (2006).
101. Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975); see also
47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
102. Additionally, the FCC promotes viewpoint, program, outlet, source, minority
ownership, and gender ownership diversity. FCC, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on
Media Ownership Rules FCC 11-186, 10–12 (2011), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-11-186A1.pdf.
103. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b)(1) (2010) (ranking based on Nielson).
104. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 414 (3d Cir. 2004).
105. Many of the economic theories and figures in this section are widely accepted
and generally undisputed. They are discussed in a slew of books, including: ROBERT
S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS (David Alexander et al.
eds., 6th ed. 2005); ALBERT E. WAUGH, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1947); LORIE
TARSHIS, THE ELEMENTS OF ECONOMICS (Edgar S. Furniss ed., 1947); ROBERT B.
PETTENGILL, PRICE ECONOMICS (1948); ARTHUR A. THOMPSON JR., ECONOMICS OF
THE FIRM: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Alice Erdman ed., 3d ed. 1981).

MCMILLAN_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

QUALITY COLLUSION

2/6/2013 10:48 PM

1907

Economists cannot measure competition directly; they target proxies
of competition, such as quantity, price, and cost.107 This Section
explains the relevant, and widely accepted, economic assumptions
and theories before delving into the negative impact quality collusion
has on social welfare.108
Model competitive markets, as represented in Figure 1,109 rely on
several assumptions: homogenous products; rational participants;110
perfect information;111 lack of participant market power;112 negligible
barriers to entry;113 demand decreasing as price increases; and supply
increasing as price increases.114 The supply curve, also known as the

106. Although initially unsuccessful, as early as Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), defendants raised the reasonableness of
restraints, and as early as United States v. American Tobacco Co., 164 F. 700, 711-712
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908), defendants based a defense on economic theory to support the
reasonableness of an alleged restraint.
107. See Jan Boone, A New Way to Measure Competition, 118 ECON. J., 1245,
1245 (2008) (discussing various means of measuring competition, all of which derive
from price, quantity, and cost).
108. “Social welfare” is an economic term of art representing the aggregate
wellbeing of individuals within society. JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE,
COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2001). In Figure 1 below, societal welfare
is the total area encompassed by the consumer and supplier surplus. See generally id.
109. See infra Figure 1 and note 118.
110. Rational market participants maximize profits. See PETTENGILL, supra note
105, at 149; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 264–65; TARSHIS, supra note
105, at 62; THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 294–96; WAUGH, supra note 105, at 248.
111. “Perfect information” means that all market participants know all of the
relevant, available, market information. See MIA DE KUIJPER, PROFIT POWER
ECONOMICS: A NEW COMPETITIVE STRATEGY FOR CREATING SUSTAINABLE WEALTH
45 (2009); TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 134–36; THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 320–47;
WAUGH, supra note 105, at 282.
112. In perfect competition, each participant’s contribution to the market is too
small to influence the market as a whole. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 109–11;
PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 8; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 134–36;
THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 130–47, 471–72; WAUGH, supra note 105, at 282–83.
Think of each market participant as a grain of sand on a beach—no single grain of
sand affects the beach as a whole.
113. “Strictly speaking, a barrier to entry is a condition that makes the long-run
costs of a new entrant into a market higher than the long-run costs of the existing
firms in the market.” RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 227 (2d ed.
1977). Examples of entry barriers include, but are not limited to, regulatory
restrictions, id., and hefty sunk costs. Elizabeth E. Bailey, Papers and Proceedings of
the Ninety-Third Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 71 AM.
ECON. REV. 178, 178 (1981).
114. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 358; TARSHIS, supra note 105,
at 156–59; THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 322–45; WAUGH, supra note 105, at 324–51.
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marginal cost curve, represents the cost of production.115 Supply and
demand intersect at a market clearing price and quantity, known as
the equilibrium.116 Buyers in a market may value a product more than
the market price, and sellers in the market may value the product less
than the market price; the difference between a party’s internal
valuation and the market price is the party’s surplus indicated by the
shaded areas.117

118

Figure 1. Basic supply and demand for a product market.

In a competitive market, individual suppliers lack market power;119
as illustrated in Figure 2, they face a flat demand curve.120 With
consumers only willing to buy at or below the market price, firms with
excess capacity have an incentive to undercut their competitors’

115. The marginal cost curve is the collection of points at which suppliers can
produce. Each point is a particular quantity that corresponds to a particular price.
See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 99–102, PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105,
at 85; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 89–103; THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 241–42;
WAUGH, supra note 105, at 264–68.
116. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 108; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note
105, at 24; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 214; THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 602–20.
117. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 184–85; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra
note 105, at 128, 300–01; WAUGH, supra note 105, at 75.
118. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 23; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at
212; THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 29.
119. See supra note 112.
120. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 273–74; THOMPSON, supra note
105, at 331–34.
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prices, thereby temporarily gaining 100% market share, to the point
that the market price is equal to their marginal cost, where further
undercutting would only lead to losses.121 Consequently, firms with
excess supply have an incentive to undercut the other in price—
thereby temporarily gaining 100% market share—up to the point that
the market price equals the firm’s marginal cost; below that, the firm
loses money on each sale.122

123

Figure 2. Basic supply and demand faced by an individual supplier.

In competitive markets, firms compete on price and quality,
eventually reaching an efficient equilibrium.124 When one of those
factors is fixed, they reach the equilibrium by adjusting the remaining
variable factor—either quality or price.125 For example, firms
compete on price to clear their production in commodities markets
like hard red spring wheat on the Minneapolis Grain Exchange,

121. See supra note 115.
122. See id.
123. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 109–11; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra
note 105, at 23 fig.2.3; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 134–36; THOMPSON, supra note
105, at 130–37, 471–72; WAUGH, supra note 105, at 282–83.
124. See DAVID BESANKO ET AL., ECONOMICS OF STRATEGY 290–95 (2009);
TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 212; THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 29.
125. See BESANKO ET AL., supra note 124, at 290–95; PETTENGILL, supra note 105,
at 123; THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 511–22.
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where quality is fixed.126 Because firms only sell at or above their
marginal cost, they can only reduce their price if their marginal cost
decreases.127 Figure 3 illustrates a decrease in suppliers’ marginal
With lower production costs, manufacturers increase
cost.128
production, lowering the market price along the existing demand
curve.129

130

Figure 3. Changes in supply (marginal cost).

126. Flour is graded by its protein content—generally the higher the protein
content, the better for baking. MGEX Spring Wheat 2010, MGEX,
http://www.mgex.com/documents/MGEX_HRS_Wheat_2010_v1a_001.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 13, 2012). The protein content for hard red spring wheat must be
between 13–14% as set by commercial standards. Id. As a result, buyers of hard red
spring wheat know what they will receive and can purchase the lowest priced wheat
on the Minneapolis Grain Exchange rather than comparing protein content relative
to their prices. Id.
127. See supra note 115.
128. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 200–09; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra
note 105, at 25; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 210.
129. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 200–09; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra
note 105, at 25 figs.2.4 & 2.5; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 210; WAUGH, supra note
105, at 259–65.
130. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 200–09; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra
note 105, at 25; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 210; WILLIAM M. WADMAN, VARIABLE
QUALITY IN CONSUMER THEORY: TOWARD A DYNAMIC MICROECONOMIC THEORY
OF THE CONSUMER 229–31 (2000); WAUGH, supra note 105, at 259–65.
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In contrast, when prices are restricted, firms compete on quality.131
The airline industry’s prices were restricted prior to deregulation in
the 1970s, so the airlines competed on quality.132 Firms increased
quality of service by offering better food and other niceties to
increase the individual demand.133 A change in quality creates a new
and distinct product offering, with new supply and demand curves.134
As represented in Figure 4, these corresponding shifts (the supply and
the demand changes) create the new equilibrium.135

136

Figure 4. Changes in quality.

If profits rise above the equilibrium, suppliers increase their
production capacity or new firms enter the market, supply increases,

131. George W. Douglas & James C. Miller III, Quality Competition, Industry
Equilibrium, and Efficiency in the Price-Constrained Airline Market, 64 AM. ECON.
REV., 657, 657–69 (1974).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 200–09; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra
note 105, at 25; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 210; WADMAN supra note 130, at 229–31;
WAUGH, supra note 105, at 259–65.
135. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 108, 200–09; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD,
supra note 105, at 24–25; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 210, 214; THOMPSON, supra note
105, at 602–20; WADMAN supra note 130 at 229–31; WAUGH, supra note 105, at 259–
65.
136. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 200–09; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra
note 105, at 25; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 210; WADMAN, supra note 130, at 229–31;
WAUGH, supra note 105, at 259–65.
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and prices return to equilibrium.137 If market characteristics prevent
self-correction (such as elasticity of supply,138 elasticity of demand,139
and entry barriers), a monopolist or cartel140 can exercise market
power by manipulating price, quality, or both to increase profit.141
Once in place, monopoly pricing decreases consumer welfare: a
portion transfers to suppliers, and another portion, known as the
deadweight loss, is lost altogether.142 Because marginal revenue143
decreases with each unit sold, monopolists maximize profit by
producing the quantity at which marginal revenue equals marginal
cost, as illustrated in Figure 5 infra.144 Because monopolizing is illegal

137. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at 200–09; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra
note 105, at 25; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 210; WADMAN supra note 130, at 229–31;
WAUGH, supra note 105, at 259–65.
138. Elasticity of supply is the measurement of how supply, for a particular
product, responds to changes in price. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 32–
33. Quantity in a market with an elastic supply is more responsive to changes in price
than a market with an inelastic supply. Id. For example, in a market where a 1%
price increase results in a 10% change in quantity, the supply would be more elastic
than a market where a 1% price increase results in a 2% change in quantity.
139. Elasticity of demand is the ratio between a change in price and the
corresponding change in the quantity demanded. See PETTENGILL, supra note 105, at
39; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 32; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 116–21;
THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 121–48; WAUGH, supra note 105, at 90.
140. A monopolist or cartel can be defined as “an association of firms with
common interests, seeking to prevent extreme or unfair competition, allocate
markets, or share knowledge.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
141. “Market power” is the ability of a firm or cartel to increase profit by charging
supracompetitive price; also barriers to entry enhance market power. See
PETTENGILL, supra note 105 at 173–75; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at
351–54, 359; TARSHIS, supra note 105, at 674–76; THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 290,
445–47; WAUGH, supra note 105, at 244–97. Barriers to entry are factors that
dissuade prospective market entrants from entering the market. These might include
intellectual property, government regulation, and sunk costs. See PINDYCK &
RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 340. The greater the barriers, the greater the cartel’s
market power. Id.
142. The restricted output eliminates the products from the market, thus no one
obtains the surplus associated with their production. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD,
supra note 105, at 304; Joseph G. Sidak, Rethinking Antitrust Damages, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 329, 333-34 (1981).
143. Marginal revenue is the revenue generated by selling an additional unit. As
production increases, the marginal cost increases because the scarcity of inputs
increases. For a more complete discussion of marginal revenue, see PETTENGILL,
supra note 105 at 42–47; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 218–21; TARSHIS,
supra note 105, at 121218–2122; THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 594; WAUGH, supra
note 105, at 309.
144. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 342–44; TARSHIS, supra note
105, at 676; THOMPSON, supra note 105, at 439–46; WAUGH, supra note 105, at 316,
318.
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under the Sherman Act,145 the antitrust community must hypothesize
what effect a proposed merger will have.146 The Agencies determine
whether the hypothetical post-merger firm could increase profits with
a small but substantial, non-transitory, increase in price—if so, the
merger is generally illegal.147

Figure 5. Monopoly supply and resulting deadweight loss.

148

Firms in otherwise competitive markets can form a cartel to
synthesize a monopoly, by coordinating production and market
participation to escape the flat demand curve shown in Figure 2,
allowing the cartel to achieve monopoly-like profits.149 Several factors
limit cartelization.150 Because a cartel forms a virtual monopoly, the

145. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
146. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32.
147. The 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32, do not cite a
percentage increase; however, a 5–10% threshold is generally accepted. FTC v. CCC
Holdings Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 38 n.12 (D.D.C. 2009) (“In most contexts, the
Merger Guidelines consider a price increase of 5% to constitute a SSNIP”); see also
FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 2008); California v.
Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
148. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 304; Sidak, supra note 142, at
333-34.
149. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 436, 462–67; JOSHUA GANS,
STEPHEN KING & GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 380 (2011).
150. See Jonathan T. Schmidt, Keeping U.S. Courts Open to Foreign Antitrust
Plaintiffs: A Hybrid Approach to the Effective Deterrence of International Cartels,
31 YALE J. INT’L L. 211, 217-18 (2006).
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market structure must allow monopolization.151 If the market allows
the cartel, it has several additional hurdles.152 The cartel must be able
to: agree on the output;153 detect cheating;154 punish cheating;155 and if
illegal, go undetected.156 If the cartel overcomes these difficulties,
they reduce social welfare by inflicting deadweight losses, harm firms
outside of the cartel, and waste resources maintaining the cartel.157
Although practically impossible to measure accurately, the collective
social harm caused by cartelization can be significant.158

151. See Schmidt, supra note 150; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 436,
462–67; GANS, supra note 149, at 380. Just like a monopolist, a cartel needs to be able
to influence the market to be effective. See Schmidt, supra note 150. The less
competition from current market participants and potential entrants, the more
market power a cartel can exert. Id.
152. See Schmidt, supra note 150, at 218.
153. Agreements between competitors can be difficult to negotiate. For example,
firms with different production methods maximize profits with differing outputs,
often forcing firms to compromise before reaching an agreement. Additionally, the
more firms involved, the greater the number of competing interests that need
placation and policing. See GANS, supra note 149, at 380; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD,
supra note 105, at 462–66; Schmidt, supra note 150.
154. Cheating occurs when a firm’s supply exceeds the agreed upon allotment.
Firms cheat because the individual firm’s profits increase as they sell units beyond the
agreed allotment, erasing the benefits of the cartel. In a quality context, firms have
to be able to accurately and consistently measure the product quality of their
competitors. See GANS, supra note 149, at 380; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note
105, at 462–66; Schmidt, supra note 150.
155. Once cheating is detected, the cartel must be able to respond by punishing the
deviant firm by returning to competitive production levels. See generally Brooke
Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
156. Cf., e.g., Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
157. To form and enforce agreements, cartels expend resources that could be spent
increasing productivity rather than restricting it. Additionally, potential competitors
may be unable to compete as a result of enlarged barriers to entry. Thus, any social
gain their competition would have created by reducing the deadweight loss is either
lost or the entrant must incur additional costs to overcome the barrier. See HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 382–87 (Jesse H. Chopper et al. eds., 2d
ed. 1999). While not technically a social harm, cartels also result in a reduction of
consumer welfare, because consumers are forced to pay more for the product,
transferring wealth to the suppliers. Id.
158. For a more complete discussion with estimates of the social cost of monopoly,
see Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL.
ECON. 807 (1975).
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Quality and the Local Television Broadcast Stations

Local broadcast television news (LBTN) is a two-sided market159
with viewers who consume content on one side, local television
broadcast stations in the middle, and advertisers that pay for content
on the other side.160 Although both sides of the market face similar
structural limitations, the transactions are very different. The
transaction between advertisers and stations is simple—advertisers
pay stations for access to the television stations’ viewers; the more
viewers, the more the revenue advertising generates per minute for
the station.161 This section explains this more complex transaction
between viewers and television stations and how cartels operate in
the market.
The competition between television stations for viewers is brutal.162
Firms pay billions of dollars for content to increase viewership,
because having more viewers means more advertising revenue.163 For
example, exclusive rights to broadcast the 2011 Super Bowl, which
captured the attention of 111,000,000 viewers, netted Fox over $3
million per commercial spot.164
Advertisers would have been
unwilling to pay Fox the same amount if Fox and NBC simulcast the
event and shared the viewers; exclusivity made the advertisements
more expensive. As a result, the Super Bowl and other NFL content
cost CBS, NBC, and Fox $3.1 billion per year.165

159. A two-sided market is a platform where one firm must interact with two
networks to generate demand from either of them. See David S. Evans, The
Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 325, 336
(2003). For example, HMOs are in a two-sided market where the insurance company
acts as a platform, bringing together a network of patients with a network of health
care professionals.
160. See Reed, supra note 7, at 28.
161. The elasticity between the number of views and the advertising rates charged
is 0.83. See Kenneth C. Wilber, A Two-Sided, Empirical Model of Television
Advertising and Viewing Markets, 27 MARKETING SCI., 356, 372 (2008). In other
words, if the number of viewers for a particular show increases by 100%, the rate for
advertising on the show would increase by 83%. See generally id.
162. See infra notes 164–65 and accompanying text.
163. See id.
164. Ben Klaymen, Super Bowl Packs in Record U.S. TV Viewer Total, REUTERS,
Feb. 7, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/07/us-superbowlratings-idUSTRE7163GS20110207.
165. Joe Flint, NFL Signs TV Rights Deals with Fox, NBC and CBS, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/15/business/la-fi-ct-nfl-deals20111215. The deal, which covers nine years and includes rights to the Super Bowl,
splits evenly among the three networks.
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When analyzing the LBTN, it is important to recognize that supply
and demand are constrained.166 On the supply side, significant entry
barriers, such as the market structure and legal restrictions, restrict
supply.167 Statutory restrictions also prevent or restrict entry by new
stations.168 In combination, firms are unlikely to enter the market in
response to a small but significant increase in price, making it more
likely that such a change would be profitable.
The demand for broadcast television is inelastic.169 Alternate
media sources such as cable television, print, radio, and the Internet
exist but they lack sufficient interchangeability with broadcast
television to curtail anticompetitive behavior in the market.170
Internet access, newspapers, and cable television are more expensive
than broadcast television.
They deliver different content.
Newspapers and radio lack video. Internet video quality lags behind
television.171 The broadcast industry, among others, might argue that
more people are turning to the Internet for news content; however,
broadband Internet access currently lacks ease of use, market
penetration,172 and content breadth to counter a cartel’s power.173 In

166. See infra notes 167–79 and accompanying text.
167. The vertically integrated market forces firms to enter two markets
simultaneously—content production and content distribution—and pay the sunk
costs for both. Television broadcast stations’ allotments are divided up and limited
by geographic areas. 47 C.F.R. § 73.622 (2011). See generally Ownership Chart: The
Big Six, FREEPRESS, http://www.freepress.net/ownership/chart/main (last visited Nov.
13, 2012) (General Electric owns NBC and Universal Studios; Walt Disney owns
ABC Television Network, Touchstone, Miramax Walt Disney Pictures, and Pixar
Animation Studios; News Corp. owns Fox Broadcasting Company, 20th Century Fox,
Fox Searchlight Pictures, and Blue Sky Studios; CBS Corporation has major holdings
in the CW network with Time Warner). The current cost of content could bankrupt
a small nation, let alone prohibit all but the wealthiest potential firms from entering
the market. Compare, for example, the nearly $3.1 billion that CBS, NBC, and Fox
pay annually to provide NFL game coverage, Flint, supra note 165, with Greenland’s
gross domestic product of $2.1 billion. CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2011), available
at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/download/index.html.
168. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.622 (2012).
169. See infra text accompanying notes 170–73.
170. See generally Prometheus Radio Project v. F.C.C., 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir.
2004).
171. If Internet video does not lack quality in transmission, then it does in
experience, as computer screens tend to be smaller than television screens.
172. Only 17% of people obtain their local news from the internet, compared to
61% for local broadcast television. Yanich, supra note 1, at 8. Moreover, the fact that
a broadcast television cartel lacks market power with one market segment does not
preclude profitable market power on the whole. See generally Press Release, FTC,
FTC Consent Order Settles Charges that Whole Foods’ Acquisition of Rival Wild
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sum, a broadcast television cartel could probably increase its profit by
charging supracompetitive prices.
Although quantity and price are the standard units of measurement
in economics,174 the traditional notions of quantity and price fail in the
market between viewers and broadcast stations.175 Price fails because
no money changes hands between viewers and stations; viewers pay
by watching commercials. Quantity fails because supply is effectively
binary; firms do or do not broadcast. Unique minutes of qualityadjusted programming and the level of advertising synthesize the
traditional concepts of quantity and price, respectively.
A unique minute of quality-adjusted programming has three parts:
a minute of programming; a level of uniqueness; and a level of
quality. Programming is only unique to the extent that it increases
the supply of content. If firms share aspects of content, such as
scripts, video feeds, and on-air personalities, or rebroadcast content at
a different time, their content is no longer unique, and the minutes of
unique programming are reduced proportionally to the redundancy.
Separate from the quantity of unique programming is quality.
Broadcast television’s primary role is to entertain and inform viewers;
the better it accomplishes these goals, the higher its quality.176
Differences in programming, such as the video feed quality and the
talent of the news anchors, influence the ability of the program to
entertain and inform. As a result, minutes of unique programming
are unequal—they need adjustment to account for differences in
quality.

Oats
Was
Anticompetitive
(Mar.
6,
2009),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/03/wholefoods.shtm.
173. The antitrust enforcement agencies typically only project two years out when
forecasting the reasonableness of a restraint. 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 27. The timeline for the Internet to be a strong
enough force in the broadcast television market to eliminate a cartel’s power is
probably more than two years.
174. See supra Part I.B.
175. See infra notes 176–78 and accompanying text.
176. As prescribed by regulation, the purpose of broadcast television is “to offer
services of any nature, consistent with the public interest, convenience, and
necessity.” 47 C.F.R. § 73.624 (2012). Although in reference to radio stations, the
FCC required the station to dedicate a nominal amount of time to non-entertainment
content, the requirement was eliminated in 1981. In re Deregulation of Radio, 84
F.C.C.2d 968, 975, 983 (1981); Glenn P. Harris, Federal Communications
Commission: Deregulation of Radio Revisited, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882, 887–88
(1987).
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Without money changing hands, the level of advertising functions
as price’s proxy.177 Audiences tolerate the intrusion of advertising in
exchange for content, and broadcasters tolerate providing content in
exchange for the viewers’ willingness to watch advertisements.178
Even though the viewers’ preference to avoid advertising is neither
absolute nor static (for example, some viewers watch the Super Bowl
expressly for the advertisements,179 which inverts the typical demand
structure), firms do have to pay attention to the quantity of
advertisements.180 Just as farmers have to set the “right price” for
hard red spring wheat, broadcast stations have to set the right level of
advertising. Based on the same economic models, if there are too
many advertisements, fewer people will watch them, driving the peradvertisement price to a point where the station will no longer be
profitable. On the other hand, if there is too little advertising, the
per-advertisement price required to maintain the station’s
profitability would be too high for advertisers to afford.181 The level
of advertising, as discussed in this Note, accounts for the minutes and
intrusiveness of advertising.182
Using the price (advertising level) and quantity (minutes of unique,
quality adjusted programming) proxies, demand is measured by the
minutes of unique quality-adjusted programming viewers consume at
a given level of advertising.183 The price that viewers pay (the level of
advertising) is relatively constant.184 Thus, with the cost of content
relatively even across stations, consumers maximize their surplus by

177. GENEVA OVERHOLSER & KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, THE PRESS 417 (2005).
178. See Wilber, supra note 161, at 376.
179. Chad Brooks, Employers Beware: Fans Wiling to Miss Work, Weddings and
FOX
BUSINESS
(Jan.
27,
2012),
More
for
Super
Bowl,
http://smallbusiness.foxbusiness.com/legal-hr/2012/01/27/employers-beware-fanswilling-to-miss-work-weddings-and-more-for-super-bowl/ (“Nearly 40 percent of
those surveyed tune in primarily for the commercials . . . .”).
180. See Super Bowl Ads Rival Game Again in 2012, According to Hanon
McKendry Poll Conducted by Harris Interactive, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 3, 2012),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/super-bowl-ads-rival-game-again-in-2012according-to-hanon-mckendry-poll-conducted-by-harris-interactive-138660569.html.
181. See supra notes 109–29 and accompanying text.
182. It is interesting to note that a broadcast station’s marginal revenue curve, as it
relates to advertisers, is particularly steep. The curve is so steep because, in addition
to the standard price reduction accompanying any increase in supply, the additional
minutes of advertising degrades the quality of the programming, reducing the
number of viewers, and making the advertising time inherently less valuable. In
other words, having more commercials makes most TV programming less enjoyable.
183. See generally supra notes 109–29 and accompanying text.
184. See Wilber, supra note 161, at 376.
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choosing the highest quality programming. In the aggregate, with
consumers individually maximizing their surplus, content with the
highest viewership is the “highest quality.”185 Therefore, Nielsen
ratings, as a measure of viewership, are possibly the best available
proxy for quality.186
As represented by the marginal revenue curve in Figure 6, supply is
the willingness of firms to produce unique minutes of quality adjusted
programming at a given level of advertising.187 A strong positive
correlation exists between minutes of unique quality-adjusted
programming and production costs.188 The correlation is the product
of the cost of producing unique programming, as opposed to
rebroadcasting the same content, and the cost of producing high
quality programming.189 As a result, in the LBTN market, based on
the model in Figure 5, to achieve monopoly like profits, cartels have
to coordinate their efforts to reduce the minutes of unique, qualityadjusted programming to the point where it intersects with the level
of advertising, as illustrated in Figure 6.
Firms have instituted SSAs, which coordinate the sharing of
services between broadcast stations to increase efficiency.190 To take
full advantage of SSAs, broadcast stations eliminate as many
redundancies as possible, including news crews, scriptwriters,
reporters, video technicians, news anchors, and studio space.191 The
result is a reduction in the uniqueness of their broadcasts for each of
those factors.

185. Comment: Reality Television, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2000, at A16. On some
level it pains the author to categorize certain shows as high quality television, yet the
purpose of television is largely its entertainment value, and as the adage goes,
“there’s no accounting for taste.” See, e.g., Who Wants to Marry a Multi-Millionaire
(FOX television broadcast Feb. 15, 2000).
186. See Nielsen Holdings N.V., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Feb. 22, 2012),
available at http://www.nielsen.com/sitelets/yir/pdfs/2011_nielsen_10k.pdf.
187. See generally supra notes 109–29 and accompanying text.
188. For an extreme example of the effect that price has on quality, compare Flint,
supra note 165 (noting the combined $3.1 billion per year that CBS, NBC, and Fox
pay for NFL coverage), with Darren Rovell, First Interview with Vince from
ShamWow!, CNBC, (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.cnbc.com/id/28880253/
First_Interview_with_Vince_from_ShamWow (highlighting that the original
ShamWow commercial cost $20,000 to produce).
189. See supra note 188.
190. See Reed, supra note 7, at 3.
191. See Yanich, supra note 1, at 22, 33-34, 63, 73.
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Figure 6. A LBTN cartel’s output restriction.

One type of SSA, known as a local news sharing agreement
(LNSA), coordinates the sharing of news coverage between
competing stations.192 Even in smaller markets, the cost of producing
a news program approaches a million dollars a year. Stations assert
that the money LNSAs save benefits the public by allowing more
coverage of a wider variety of topics. Some stations, appearing to
assert the failing firm defense, claim that the agreements allow their
continuing operation.193 The actual cost savings are undisclosed and
difficult to estimate; however, various firms have asserted that they
allow operations that would otherwise be financially unfeasible.194
Although formed in the name of efficiency, LNSAs can have a
significant anticompetitive impact. LNSAs coordinate participating
firms’ output and allow the participants to reduce or eliminate
competition for exclusive content.195 Once an agreement is in place,

192. See Yanich, supra note 1, at 6.
193. See Stelter, supra note 2; Hillary Atkin, As Local Sharing Progresses, New
Concerns Emerge, TVWEEK (Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.tvweek.com/news/
2009/08/as_local_sharing_progresses_ne.php (last visited Nov. 7, 2011); Honolulu
Stations in Shared Services Deal, TVNEWSCHECK (Aug. 18, 2009),
http://www.tvnewscheck.com/article/2009/08/18/34810/honolulu-stations-in-sharedservices-deal.
194. See Atkin, supra note 193.
195. Yanich, supra note 1, at 24, 35.

MCMILLAN_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

2/6/2013 10:48 PM

QUALITY COLLUSION

1921

the number of unique and local stories declines although the length of
news programming increases.196
Independent stations have the same effect on a cartel as a
cheater.197 The cartel restricts supply of content driving up the per
unit price. In response, independent firms will increase supply until
their marginal cost equals their marginal revenue, increasing their
profit at the cartel’s expense.198 For example, a hypothetical market
has three firms, two of which are in a cartel. The firms in the cartel
have a composite 60% share of the market by producing better
quality content at a lower cost than the independent station. The
cartel, simulcasting identical content, evenly divides the 60%—thus
each firm receives 30% of the market. The non-participating firm
supplies the remaining 40% of the market. This does not mean that
member firms’ profits are lower than they would be without the
cartel—so long as the savings on production are substantial enough,
net profits can still increase. According to Nielsen ratings, in markets
with SSAs, independent stations outperform the SSA.199
II. THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN ANTITRUST LAW AND
PRACTICE
The statutes prohibit all unreasonable restraints on trade,
regardless of whether they are based on price, quantity, or quality.200
To determine the veracity that quality collusion is pursued, the
author, on September 1, 2012, conducted a search of all U.S. District,
Circuit, and Supreme Court cases within the LexisNexis Trade Cases
database that included the term “antitrust” and “collusion” extending
back to September 1, 2002.201 The search returned 806 results.202 The
author then reviewed the cases for instances which raised quality

196. See id. at 24.
197. See generally supra Part I.B.
198. See generally GANS, supra note 149, at 380; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra
note 105, at 462–66; Schmidt, supra note 150.
199. Yanich, supra note 1, at 24, 35, 45. The fact that stations accept lower ratings
in exchange for market share indicates that the cost savings created by the SSAs are
substantial.
200. See supra Part I.A.
201. LEXIS NEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com (follow Area of Law—By Topic”
hyperlink; then follow “Antitrust & Trade” hyperlink; then follow “US Supreme,
Appellate, District and Claims Court Trade Cases” hyperlink; then search “antitrust
and collusion” from “09/01/2002” to “09/01/2012”) (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).
202. Id.
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collusion as an issue.203 One percent of cases focused on quality
collusion as a primary issue and less than three percent of the cases
reviewed mentioned quality as a secondary issue. Part A of this
section discusses the probable justifications for this non-enforcement.
Part B then discusses how the probable justifications for nonenforcement are inapplicable in certain markets.
A. Why the Antitrust Community Should Ignore Quality
Collusion
Probable justifications for non-enforcement of quality collusion
stem from the fact that quantifying quality is difficult, making cases
involving quality expensive and difficult to win. In addition, quality
adjustments change the demand curve, possibly negating any societal
harm. Finally, in many cases, standardization enhances competition.
Many products lend themselves to quality quantification. For
example, a sheet of standard copy paper is eight-and-a-half by eleven
inches—deviant paper is easy to detect. Many products however, are
not easily compared. Product quality can be difficult to measure
because of the product’s abstract nature, complexity, or its
consumers’ idiosyncratic preferences. Clearly, the more abstract a
product is, the more difficult it is to determine its quality.204 Product
complexity also makes quantification difficult as different factors bear
different weights on the product’s overall quality. Moreover, certain
factors are synergistic, while others are antagonistic.205 Subjectivity
imposes an enormous burden on quantifying quality, potentially
bringing even a simple product’s quality into dispute. What some
people consider excellent, others consider unacceptable, and because

203. The review was limited to reading one hundred words on each side of the
word “quality” to determine whether quality could be at issue. If it was likely raised
as an issue, the author read the entire opinion to determine whether a party raised a
restraint on quality as an issue.
204. Consider the quality of abstract products, such as education. U.S. NEWS bases
40% of their law school rankings on peer and legal professionals’ reputational
assessments of the schools.
205. For example, imagine Dean Munching is considering whether to order a pizza
from Anthony’s or Bobby’s. Anthony’s uses premium ingredients for the pizza crust
and a homemade sauce, but they use canned toppings. Bobby’s uses premium
ingredients for the crust and fresh toppings, but the sauce is from a can. To
determine pizza quality, Dean Munching considers each of the inputs that make up
the pizza, weighs them according to their importance to her, and then aggregates
them to determine each pizza’s total quality.
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subjectivity is infinitely variable, ultimately even price is subjective.206
Consumers’ conflicting opinions on quality extend from airplanes to
cars, computers, and pizza. Thus, quantifying quality can be
difficult.207
Although quality collusion claims are essentially non-existent,
quality has been at issue in antitrust disputes.208 For example, to
define the relevant market,209 in Federal Trade Commission v. Whole
Foods Market, Inc., the Commission attempted to block a merger
between Whole Foods Market, Inc. (Whole Foods) and Wild Oats
Markets, Inc. (Wild Oats) with a temporary restraining order.210 Part
of the Commission’s argument required the court to differentiate
between premium grocery stores211 and standard grocery stores.212
The Commission argued, based on Whole Foods’s internal
documents, that the merger would provide Whole Foods, as a
premium grocery store, with monopoly power in several geographic
areas.213 The Commission failed to persuade the trial court that
Safeway and Whole Foods operated in different markets and service
different customers.214 Because of the Commission’s difficulty, the

206. To a person living below the poverty line, ten dollars could represent three or
four meals, while a person with income four times the level of poverty might spend
that much on a can of soda at a baseball game. Clearly, a can of soda is not as
valuable to the person at the baseball game as four meals are to the person living
below the poverty line.
207. Continuing with Dean Munching, see supra note 205, she is still contemplating
where to order her pizza. She is planning a luncheon with a colleague—Professor
Picky—who happens to be a pizza connoisseur that she would like to impress. Dean
Munching and Professor Picky both weigh the crust as the most important aspect of a
pizza. Because both Bobby’s and Anthony’s use premium ingredients in their crusts,
Dean Munching must continue her examination further. Professor Picky loves fresh
tomato and basil toppings while Dean Munching prefers a hearty, flavored sauce. In
this instance, Dean Munching, in an effort to impress, defers to Professor Picky’s
pizza preference and orders from Bobby’s. Clearly, no matter how you slice it,
people have different perceptions of what constitutes better pizza.
208. See supra notes 201–03 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 201–03 and accompanying text.
210. See FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007).
211. Examples of such grocery stores include Whole Foods and Wild Oats. Id. at 4–
5.
212. Examples cited by the court include: Safeway, Giant Eagle, Giant Food, Stop
& Shop, Harris Teeter, Food Lion, and Publix. Id. at 12.
213. See id. at 19.
214. See id. at 49. After the Commission lost at trial, the merger was
consummated. The Commission continued litigating the case. Id. More than two
years after the merger plans were announced, the Commission and Whole Foods
Market, Inc. entered into a consent decree which required the divesture of several
stores as well as intellectual property. See Press Release, FTC, FTC Consent Order
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Community likely has legitimate concerns over its ability to define
quality sufficiently before a court.215
The benefit of certain horizontal quality agreements outweighs the
harm.216 If challenged, courts would likely treat beneficial restraints
as reasonable.217 Weighing in favor of horizontal agreements on
quality are factors such as: (1) reducing information and transactional
costs;218 (2) enhancing network effects;219 (3) eliminating free riders;220
and (4) leveraging resources.221
Product standardization can reduce information and transaction
costs.222 In markets with product differentiation, consumers research
and compare various products, calculate the various options’ worth,
and negotiate transactions separately to account for these variables
before making an informed buying decision.223 In markets with
standardization, consumers can understand and compare price
differential more easily.224 The clearest example of this is in
commodities markets such as hard red spring wheat, where buyers
compare a standardized product and make purchasing decisions
based solely on price.225 In this and other similar markets, firms must
match or beat competitors’ prices to clear their production.
Standardization can help consumers with enhanced network effects
and eliminate lock-in costs.226 Consider telephones—a standard
telephone exchange extends the market to include everyone with a

Settles Charges that Whole Foods’ Acquisition of Rival Wild Oats Was
Anticompetitive
(Mar.
6,
2009),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/
2009/03/wholefoods.shtm.
215. See, e.g., FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 270 (8th Cir. 1995)
216. See Posner, supra note 158 and accompanying text.
217. One example of a potentially beneficial restraint was seen in a recent case,
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). In Leegin,
the Court ruled that vertical price restraints were no longer per se illegal because
sufficient inter-brand price competition could prevent monopolistic prices, and the
restraints could reduce free-riding, enhancing non-price competition. Id. at 895–900.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 124-29; infra note 227 and accompanying
text.
219. See infra notes 228–29 and accompanying text.
220. See infra notes 229–35 and accompanying text.
221. See infra notes 229–35 and accompanying text.
222. See infra notes 224–26 and accompanying text.
223. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105, at 168–70, 618.
224. See supra note 126 and accompanying text; infra note 226 and accompanying
text.
225. See supra note 126.
226. This is especially true for consumable products related to capital
expenditures—for example, razor blades, printer cartridges, bolts, car parts, etc.
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telephone—regardless of a consumer’s individual service provider.
The larger network enhances consumer utility, increasing overall
demand. Likewise, standardization reduces consumers’ lock-in costs
by allowing consumers to make subsequent purchases from any
participating firm, making the aftermarket competitive.227
Standardization can also eliminate or reduce free-riding.228 Firms
are reticent to invest when a free-rider problem exists.229 They either
fear that their competition will benefit without incurring the costs, or
they believe they can free ride and derive the benefit without the
associated costs.230 Horizontal agreements can limit free riders and
their negative impact, by sharing the expenses amongst the firms
certain to benefit. Examples of legitimate agreements that limit free
riders include research and development for Blu-Ray Discs,231 and
advertising campaigns for pork232 and milk.233 Thus, by limiting free
riders, firms are willing to undertake programs that would not make
sense for a firm acting alone.234

227. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 465–70
(1992) (explaining that even if a firm lacks market power in the primary market, it
may be able to exert market power in a secondary market). Bolts are another
example where standardization increased consumer utility. See generally William
Sellers, The United States Standard Screw Threads (1864), ASME,
http://anniversary.asme.org/
2005landmarks3.shtml (last visited Nov. 13, 2012).
Initially, independent
manufacturers made bolts with unique threading until the Franklin Institute pushed
for standardization. Id. The standardization eliminated supplier lock–in, allowing
companies to repair machines without having to use custom bolts or order specific
bolts from the original manufacturer. Id.
228. Free-riding is when market participants receive economic benefits without
incurring the related cost. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
229. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 105 at 668.
230. See id.
231. Blu-Ray was developed with support from more than 180 companies including
LG Electronics Inc., Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Sony Corporation, Twentieth
Century Fox, Walt Disney Pictures, and Warner Bros. Entertainment. See Blu-ray
FAQ, BLU-RAY.COM, http://www.blu-ray.com/faq/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2012).
232. Although created through an act of Congress eliminating questions of
antitrust legality, this horizontal agreement of the National Pork Board, which
charges pork producers a 0.4% surcharge on every pound of pork sold, gave us the
wonderful tag line: “Pork: The Other White Meat.” See About the National Pork
Board, NAT’L PORK BOARD, http://www.porkbeinspired.com/AboutTheNational
PorkBoard.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2012).
233. The expression “Got Milk?” was a creation of the California Milk Processor
Board, which charges milk processors in California a $.03 surcharge on each gallon
sold to fund the advertising campaign. See CALIFORNIA MILK PROCESSOR BOARD,
http://www.gotmilk.com/ (follow “About” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 13, 2012).
234. See, e.g., supra notes 232–34 and accompanying text.
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Horizontal agreements can also allow firms to pool resources and
leverage various individual firms’ strengths to accomplish projects
beyond the reach of an individual firm.235 For example, contractual
agreements between pharmaceutical companies, hospitals, and
universities form the basis for research alliances and joint research
projects that develop new drugs.236 By integrating their efforts, firms
can leverage their expertise, access to capital markets, and intellectual
property,237 while limiting their exposure to the cost of a failed drug,
which can reach almost a billion dollars.238 It also gives companies
access to scarce resources.239
Between the potential costs and the potential benefits of horizontal
non-price agreements, net economic effect can be difficult to
ascertain.240 When confronted with antitrust cases that are difficult to
decide, courts have a tendency to utilize the ROR.241 Accordingly,
courts would probably utilize the ROR to determine the legality of a
quality-based agreement. With the burden of proof in their favor,
defendants will likely prevail.242
B.

Why the Antitrust Community Should Not Ignore Quality
Collusion

Cartels can inflict a severe deadweight loss on society.243 The
antitrust statutes are broad enough to encompass and prohibit quality
collusion in addition to the traditional price and quantity
restrictions.244 Guidance provided by the Commission and the
235. See infra notes 237–40 and accompanying text.
236. See infra notes 238–40.
237. For example, the differences in firm expertise could involve leveraging a
university’s clinical research facility with financial assistance from a pharmaceutical
company that has greater access to financial markets.
238. By allowing firms to diversify their research, they are able to limit downside
risk while maintaining a similar long-term upside potential. The adage, “Don’t put
all your eggs in one basket,” promotes diversification. For example, Pfizer put a lot
of eggs in one basket when it invested almost $1 billion on Torcetrapib before
deciding the drug was a failure. See Alex Berenson & Andrew Pollack, Pfizer Shares
Plummet on Loss of a Promising Heart Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/05/health/05pfizer.html.
239. By working with hospitals, drug companies have greater access to patients for
their clinical trials, as well as doctors to run the trials.
240. See supra notes 227–40 and accompanying text.
241. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877
(2007).
242. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 158.
244. See supra Part I.A.
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Division reinforces this assertion—it even indicates that quality has
moved from a trivial factor to an important consideration of the
Agencies.245 In certain markets, the interactions between price,
quantity, and quality allow firms to extract monopoly profits by
manipulating quality instead of quantity or price.246 Therefore, a gap
exists between what enforcement agencies should pursue and what
they do pursue.247
The anticompetitive impact of LNSAs on viewers has gone
unchallenged by the Commission and the Division for at least ten
years.248 The FCC has stated that it is investigating the matter.249
However, this is not to say that the industry has escaped all
enforcement. On the contrary, there have been numerous antitrust
actions filed—the actions simply ignore the antitrust violations’
impact on viewers.250
In 2011 the Division filed a civil complaint to enjoin the merger
between Cumulus Media, Inc. and Citadel Broadcasting Corporation,
two radio broadcast companies.251 The Division’s complaint,252
competitive impact statement,253 and consent decree254 focused on the
245. Compare 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 35 (using the
word “quality” five times, but only in one instance—a footnote, expressing concern
over a potential negative impact on quality), with 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note 32 (using the word “quality” six times in all, but one instance
expressing concern over the negative impact of a merger on quality). The increased
prominence of quality and the negative effects that mergers can have on it suggests
that the Commission and the Division agree that quality manipulation is or can be
illegal.
246. See supra Part II.B.
247. In addition to the research described in Part II.B., infra, the author conducted
a search of the Commission and the Division’s enforcement activity on their
respective websites. The Commission’s website allows searches of documents
extending back through 1996. Since 1996, the only document to contain the term
“broadcast television” concerned cable television companies. FTC Competition
Enforcement Database, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/caselist/index.shtml (last updated
Oct. 19, 2011). This is not to say that the media has been free of antitrust
enforcement.
248. See supra notes 201–03 and accompanying text.
249. See Stetler, supra note 2.
250. Id.
251. Complaint, United States v. Cumulus Media Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01619 (D.D.C.
Sept. 8, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f274800/274819.pdf.
252. Id.
253. Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Cumulus Media Inc., No.
available
at
1:11-cv-01619
(D.D.C.
Sept.
8,
2011),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f274800/274828.pdf.
“Competitive
impact
statements” are summaries of the Division’s economic findings regarding a particular
case. See, e.g., id.
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sale of radio advertising, while remaining silent on the effect that the
merger would have had on listeners. There was no discussion in any
of the documents as to whether the merger would adversely affect the
quality of programming on the stations.255
Three years earlier, in 2008, Raycom acquired three television
broadcast stations from Lincoln Financial Media Company.256 One of
the stations was in a market where Raycom was already present,
giving Raycom ownership of two of the four broadcast stations in that
market.257 In response to the consolidation, the Division filed for an
injunction.258 While remaining silent on the impact the merger would
have on programming, the competitive impact statement stated that
continued ownership by Raycom of one of the acquired stations
“would substantially lessen competition in the sale of broadcast
television spot advertising”259 in that market. The final judgment
required divestiture260 of the station and prevented local marketing or
joint sales agreements between Raycom and the divested station—the
stations appear to be free to engage in LNSAs.261
Prior to those cases, the Division filed to block a media
consolidation in the Salt Lake City broadcast television market.262

254. United States v. Cumulus Media Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01619 (D.D.C. Nov. 29,
In an
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f279100/279195.pdf.
antitrust setting, “consent decrees” are agreements whereby a firm consents to act in
accordance with the demands of the Commission. See, e.g., In re Whole Foods Mkt.,
Inc., No. 9324, 2009 WL 1557334 (F.T.C. May 29, 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9324/090529wfdo.pdf.
255. See generally United States v. Cumulus Media Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01619
(D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2011); Complaint, United States v. Cumulus Media Inc., No. 1:11cv-01619 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2011); Competitive Impact Statement, United States v.
Cumulus Media Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01619 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2011).
256. Complaint, United States v. Raycom Media Inc., No. 1:08-cv-01510 (D.D.C.
Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f236600/236613.pdf.
257. See generally id.
258. Id. at 1.
259. Competitive Impact Statement at 2, United States v. Raycom Media Inc., No.
1:08-cv-01510
(D.D.C.
Aug.
28,
2008),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f236600/236618.pdf.
260. Specific performance in antitrust, has included—as it did in this case—
mandatory divestment, as well as requiring the operations to continue as long as they
remain fiscally possible. United States v. Raycom Media Inc., No. 1:08-cv-01510
(D.D.C.
Dec.
4,
2008),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/
f240100/240199.pdf.
261. See generally id.
262. See generally Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 1, United States v. News
Corporation Ltd., No. 1:01CV0077 (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 2001), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f8000/8039.pdf.
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The News Corporation (owner of KTVX-TV, a Fox Television
affiliate station) proposed an acquisition of Chris Craft (owner of
KSTU-TV, an ABC affiliate station), which would have placed 40%
of the Salt Lake City broadcast television spot advertising market
under common ownership.263 Again the Division challenged the
merger because the merger would substantially lessen competition in
the broadcast television advertising market.264 The complaint and the
competitive impact statement were silent on the merger’s potential
impact on quality.265 The final judgment required divestiture of the
station and prevented local marketing or joint sales agreements
between Raycom and the divested station—again, the stations appear
to be free to engage in LNSAs.266
The lack of concern exists in non-broadcast media as well. In 2004,
the Daily Gazette Company and MediaNews Group, Inc.
consummated a merger.267 In 2007, the Division filed an action to
unwind the transaction, alleging that the merger eliminated price and
non-price competition.268 The reduction in non-price competition was
manifested in the termination of a Saturday publication, the reduction
of local news stories, and the elimination of several sections from the
newspapers.269 In 2010, the companies agreed to a consent decree that
unwound the merger.270 The consent decree included specific
performance on price requirements to rebuild the diminished
subscriber base; however, the eliminated Saturday publication, the
reduction of local news stories, and the elimination of several sections
from the newspapers were untouched.271 Again, price concerns

263. Id. at 2.
264. Id. at 8.
265. Id. at 1; Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. News Corp. Ltd., No.
1:01CV00771
(D.D.C.
May
14,
2001),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f8300/8374.pdf.
266. See generally United States v. News Corp. Ltd., No. 1:01CV0077, 2001 WL
34038534 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2001).
267. Complaint at 1, United States v. Daily Gazette Co., No. 2:07-0329 (S.D. W.
Va. May 22, 2007), 2007 WL 1571956.
268. Id. at 2.
269. Id. at 3.
270. United States v. Daily Gazette Co., No. 2:07-0329, 2007 WL 7575700 (S.D. W.
Va. Oct. 18, 2007).
271. Id.
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trumped quality. The newspapers currently co-publish a single
weekend edition.272
Clearly, under the right circumstances, firms are able to form
cartels and charge supracompetitive prices.273 Participating firms find
ways to increase their profit, with little concern regarding the effect
on the consumer (listener, viewer, reader, etc.).274 The statutes,
however, also cover agreements on quality just as much as those on
price.275 Although the Agencies’ guidance and case law indicate that
quality agreements are illegal,276 there appears to be little in the way
of enforcement action by the Community.277
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN THE LAW
AND THE PRACTICE OF A NTITRUST E NFORCEMENT
Quality collusion is a highway with vague and infrequent signs and
no police. Firms have no idea how fast they can drive or how
expensive tickets are. In fact, they probably dismiss the possibility of
a citation altogether. As a result, they freely collude on quality in
violation of the antitrust laws with a resulting increase in social harm.
While a multitude of solutions exists, this Note discusses four of them:
(A) increase quality collusion enforcement; (B) develop strategies to
quantify quality; (C) adopt a framework to adjudicate quality
collusion claims; and (D) conduct retrospective analyses of the
aforementioned strategies.
A. Increase Enforcement Actions Against Quality Collusion
To reduce quality collusion, the Commission and Division should
increase enforcement against quality collusion by (1) increasing the
prominence and depth of quality analyses in actions brought
primarily on price; and (2) by bringing actions based entirely on
quality collusion.278 The increase in enforcement would reduce
quality collusion through direct intervention against firms involved
with quality collusion. An increase in enforcement will also act as a

272. As of the writing of this Note, there is a joint weekend publication between
the two companies. See CHARLESTON NEWSPAPERS, https://iservices.cnpapers.com
(last visited July 5, 2012).
273. See supra Part I.B.
274. See supra Part I.B.
275. See supra Part I.A.
276. See supra Part I.A.
277. See supra notes 201–03 and accompanying text.
278. See supra Part II.B.
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deterrent, signaling that the enforcement agencies will not tolerate
anticompetitive quality collusion.
Concerns over increased
enforcement such as its cost and overly constrictive self-regulation are
reasonable, yet improbable.
By pursuing quality collusion within claims that would have
previously been brought exclusively on charges of price or output
collusion, enforcement agencies can maximize the deterrent effect of
their actions. For example, the Raycom complaint279 only cited the
effect the merger would have on the advertising market. The
Commission could have discussed the importance of the merger’s
impact on the programming quality as well, to signal its broader
focus. Because enforcement action was already underway, the
additional enforcement cost of pursuing the quality issue would be
minimal. An increase in enforcement will bolster the current anemic
case law, thus providing firms with a clearer delineation between proand anticompetive horizontal agreements. This move would enhance
self-regulation as well.
Increasing enforcement prevents firms from continuing
anticompetitive behavior.
Being the subject of an antitrust
enforcement action costs time, money,280 and public relations.281
Rational firms will reduce their exposure to antitrust actions.
Although firms will still assume some risk of defending antitrust
actions based on their cost-benefit analyses, additional enforcement
will shift the equation and increase self-regulation that in turn will
reduce the future burden on the Agencies, enhance competition, and
increase social welfare.
It is true that increasing enforcement increases litigation costs. A
single antitrust case is extremely expensive,282 and it is unlikely that
the Commission and the Division’s current budgets could support a

279. See Complaint, United States v. Raycom Media, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-01510
(D.D.C. Aug. 28, 2008).
280. See supra Part I.A.
281. Antitrust complaints connote the idea that the company is taking advantage of
its customers, which causes public relations issues. For example, Microsoft
experienced major public relations setbacks as a result of their antitrust woes. See
Elizabeth Corcoran, For Gates, Fight May Prove Costly, WASH. POST, May 19, 1998,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/longterm/microsoft/stories/
microtale19.htm.
282. The Division spent more than $50,000,000 related to the Microsoft antitrust
litigation. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Declan
McCullagh, DOJ Pushes Case Against MS, WIRED (Jan. 12, 2001),
http://www.wired.com/news/antitrust/0,1551,41163,00.html.
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significant increase in antitrust litigation.283 A modest increase in
funding, however, could justify itself by enhancing self-regulation,
clarifying case law, and encouraging firms to self-regulate out of fear
of an enforcement action.
Concern about overzealous self-regulation is rarely a worthwhile
consideration.284 If enforcement went too far, firms might shy away
from aggressive procompetitive strategies fearing costly litigation.
The counterargument is that increased enforcement will clarify case
law, helping firms conform to the proper standards—reducing
antitrust litigation spending through compliance rather than laxity.
Additionally, the judiciary’s increased experience could decrease the
per-case cost of litigation.285 The news companies could revert to
their pre-LNSA methods of acquiring original content.
Although the cost concerns are rational, weighing the positives
against the negatives shows that the balance favors quality-based
enforcement.
Consider an increase of quality-based antitrust
enforcement in the broadcast television market. Currently, this
enforcement is negligible, making any spending on enforcement a
cost attributable to the new strategy.286 Any change in the market
would also be a result of the increased enforcement. To begin, the
Commission or the Division would choose a market with LNSAs, in
which they would likely prevail. Because the sharing is facially so
extreme in Honolulu, the city would be an ideal starting point.287 If
the agency prevailed, the next case brought would have the Honolulu
case law to support it.288 As the enforcement progressed to different
market groups, firms would dissolve LNSAs rather than face the
certain litigation expenses. Eventually, firms beyond the television
broadcast industry would take note and adjust their course. In the
end, the Agencies would litigate relatively few cases compared to the
number of horizontal agreements that would break up.

283. See supra Part I.A.
284. Additionally, courts have dealt with overzealous attempts at enforcing
antitrust laws in the past, indicating the system is already prepared. In re Indus. Gas
Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514, 520 (7th Cir. 1982).
285. It was experience that allowed the judiciary to qualify certain activities as per
se illegal, conserving judicial resources in the process. See supra notes 48–51 and
accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 201–03.
287. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
288. On the other hand, if the agencies increase enforcement and lose at trial, their
additional litigation expenditures might be counterproductive, encouraging firms to
push the boundaries of antitrust law even further.
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Develop Strategies for Quantifying Quality

The Community attempts to define quality in enforcement actions
by requiring parties to define the relevant market.289
The
Commission’s initial failure in FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc.
demonstrates how difficult quantifying quality can be.290 Two factors
favor the Community’s quantification of quality: (1) successful quality
collusion will only occur in industries where it is practical to fix
quality, and (2) in certain cases, enforcement will only require
determining the direction and not the magnitude of a quality
manipulation.
Thus, when implemented in conjunction with
retrospective studies, to enhance the enforcement actions’
effectiveness, there are no compelling reasons to ignore quality
collusion.
Although the qualities of simple products, like bolts or hard red
spring wheat, are easily quantifiable, most products are more
complex. Even so, industries develop and implement means of
quantifying difficult-to-measure qualities.
For example, pasta
companies measure the amount of semolina and durum wheat291 and
cell phone companies count dropped calls.292 Even a complex service,
like hospital care, is quantifiable, based on patient mortality and the
number of foreign objects retained after surgery.293 In rooting out
quality collusion, plaintiffs can use the industries’ experts and metrics
to prove their case.
Quality collusion is likely to occur in industries where quality is
easily manipulated or quantified.294 Successful cartels need to be able
to agree on output, detect and punish cheating, and, if illegal, remain
undetected. The difficulties the Agencies will have in quantifying
quality are the same difficulties that the firms face in forming
289.
290.
291.
292.

See supra Part II.A.

592 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2009); see supra Part II.A.
Nat’l Macaroni Mfrs. Ass’n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421, 424 (7th Cir. 1965).
Will Park, AT&T Customers Log the Most Dropped Call Complaints,
Verizon Claims Fewest, INTOMOBILE (May 5, 2010, 4:35 PM),
http://www.intomobile.com/2010/05/05/att-customers-log-the-most-dropped-callcomplaints-verizon-claims-least/ (citing ChangeWave Research).
293. Special Open Door Forum: Hospital Value Based Purchasing Proposed Rule
Overview for Facilities Providers and Suppliers, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVICES
(Feb.
10,
2011),
https://www.cms.gov/HospitalQualityInits/
downloads/0210_Slides.pdf; see also Ann L. T. Powell et al., Uniform Ripening

Encodes a Golden 2-like Transcription Factor Regulating Tomato Fruit Chloroplast
Development,
336
SCIENCE
1711
(2012),
available
at
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/336/6089/1711.full.pdf.
294. See supra Part I.B.
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cartels.295 If firms cannot measure or manipulate product quality,
then they will either be unable to agree, destroying the cartel before
inception, or they will cheat and sap the supracompetitive profit from
the cartel.296 As a result, in these industries, cartels are unworthy of
antitrust scrutiny. However, in industries where a cartel succeeds, the
Agencies can use the same tools the cartel uses to operate and
maintain compliance to condemn the cartel.
To remedy antitrust violations in quality collusion, the Agencies
only need to seek injunctive relief for a disparity in performance.297
Cases where an agreement increases product quality are likely
reasonable and therefore legal. Accordingly, in the absence of
monetary damages, courts can limit their query to the direction of a
quality change without bogging themselves down with the details of
the magnitude of the quality change. Determining a directional
change is generally easier than determining the magnitude of a
change. For example, consider two tomatoes: an heirloom tomato,
bred for taste, grown locally on a farm, ripened on the vine, and
picked at the peak of ripeness; the other bred for uniformity of color,
grown in a greenhouse halfway around the globe, picked when green,
and ripened with ethylene.298 By sampling the tomatoes, a person
could determine which one tastes better—but objectively quantifying
that difference would be much more difficult. If tomato growers did
not have antitrust immunity, then the Agencies could order the
tomato growers’ organization disbanded—without quantifying the
differences between the tomatoes.299
Courts have had difficulty understanding and applying complex
economic theory derived from industry metrics.300 The two possible
erroneous outcomes in antitrust enforcement litigation are false
positives and false negatives. When faced with borderline cases,

295.
296.
297.
298.

See generally notes 149–58 and accompanying text.
See generally notes 149–58 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Pocket K No. 12: Delayed Ripening Technology, INT’L SERVICE

FOR

ACQUISITION
AGRI-BIOTECH
APPLICATIONS
(Apr.
2004),
http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/pocketk/12/default.asp.
299. The tomato-growing example is for illustration purposes only. Farmers have a
specific antitrust exemption that allows the exact agreement detailed. See 7 U.S.C. §§
see
also
FLORIDA
TOMATO
COMMITTEE,
291–92
(2006);
http://www.floridatomatoes.org/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
300. See, e.g., Cellophane Fallacy, supra Part I.A.
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lower courts have erred on the side of lax enforcement301—minimizing
the risk of false positives. On the other side, the quality collusion
enforcement vacuum limits the cost of false negatives to the cost of
litigation. However, because cartels can exact such a high price on
society,302 the Community should seriously consider increasing its
quality collusion enforcement efforts.
There are few industries where quality is as subjective as it is in
LBTN, yet it is at times necessary to quantify quality. In addition, the
Agency will have to prove the existence of a restraint and prove that
the restraint is unreasonable. To examine quality, plaintiffs or the
Agency could measure the broadcast content as other have done, or
develop new metrics. Based on these metrics, the Agency would have
to show an injury to establish that the restraint is unreasonable.
Studies by Danilo Yanich and Gregory S. Crawford303 have
quantified numerous quality indicators. Going beyond these studies,
the Community could quantify the number of unique news stories in a
market, the number of minutes dedicated to unique news stories, the
number of viewpoints on a given topic, as well as turning to the
industry’s existing market data. Alternatively, the Agencies could
simply rely on the absence of differentiation—for example, the fact
that multiple stations use the same camera, the same studio, the same
on-air personality, the same script, or even identical programming—
to show that quality was fixed. The directional shift in quality could
then be determined by comparing the quality of the broadcast in that
market with the quality of the broadcast in other equivalent markets.
Whether a study could be extensive or reliable enough to convince a
court remains untested; however the possibility exists. If a college
professor with a team of research assistants quantified certain aspects
of LBTN,304 the news and its quality is clearly quantifiable.
Based on these studies, the Agencies still would have to prove that
the restraints are unreasonable. The opinions of Judge Learned
Hand,305 congressional action relating to other news media,306 and
statutory and regulatory language307 make it clear that the LNSA’s

301. Compare FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1032–33 (D.C. Cir.
2008), with Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servss, 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
302. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
303. See supra Part I.C.
304. See supra Part I.C.
305. See infra note 321 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
307. See supra Part I.A.
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duplicative and constrictive news coverage harms society. It is
equally clear that the Commission or the Division should pursue
LNSAs in accordance with the existing antitrust laws.
C.

Utilize a Three-Factor Framework

Because horizontal agreements on quality can have a legitimate
business purpose,308 and the per se rule is reserved for activities that
lack a legitimate business purpose, quality collusion would probably
be judged under either a ROR, which can be expensive, or a quick
look analysis, which only handles cases that are easier to determine.
This Note advances a three-factor framework that could simplify the
initial sorting when determining whether an agreement is reasonable.
By providing the courts with this framework, market participants can
make better strategic decisions, Agencies can decide when to bring
cases more accurately, and courts can execute more consistent and
accurate rulings in less time with less cost.
Clarifying the boundary between legal and illegal conduct could
increase compliance. When deciding whether to pursue an antitrust
claim, the Agencies face many of the same questions a cartel faces
during its formation: What will the litigation cost? What is the likely
profitability of the cartel? What is an enforcement action’s probable
outcome? Moreover, there are other legitimate concerns. The threefactor framework will help both sides by demarcating the boundary
between legitimate and illegitimate actions. Answering in the
affirmative for any of the three factors would demand a deeper probe.

1.

The Three Factors, Generally

Standardization can enhance competition.
Question one
determines the first factor: “Does the industry typically compete on
the facet of quality that is allegedly manipulated?” This inquiry
carves out an exception for industries enhanced by standardization.
Product standardizations, such as the protein content of hard red
spring wheat traded on the Minneapolis Grain Exchange, allow
manufacturers that use the wheat to buy from whoever is able to
supply it.309 The demand of a large manufacturer may exceed a
farmer’s supply. In that case, standardization allows smaller farmers
to provide the market with wheat, even if they cannot meet the needs
of the larger buyer alone. The Minneapolis Grain Exchange has
308. See supra Part I.B.
309. See supra note 126.
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existed since 1881 due to the mutually beneficial agreement.310 The
exchange’s long history would provide it with security from
enforcement.
Many markets self-correct without involving the legal system.
Question two determines the second factor: “Is the market
susceptible to small yet substantial changes in quality without a
reflexive demand change?” In this case, markets reach a competitive
equilibrium naturally.311 In markets with quality inelastic demand,
self-correction may be limited.312 If this occurs, a cartel can reduce
quality without a demand shift returning the market to a competitive
level, allowing the cartel to earn supracompetitive profits.
The second question can be critical in two-sided markets, where
one side of the market subsidizes the other. The disconnect between
consumption and compensation facilitates a profitable reduction in
quality by acting as a barrier between the suppliers and the
consumers. For example, in the oral hygiene market, dentists exist in
a two-sided market. Consumption and compensation are severed:
employers select and pay insurance companies; insurance companies
pay dentists based on patients’ consumption. Worsening matters,
patients have a difficult time ascertaining quality of care. As a result,
a dental cartel could agree to restrict the quality of filling materials.
The market structure limits the patients’ recourse to extremes: change
their employers, purchase different yet duplicative insurance, or try to
pressure their employers into pressuring the insurance company into
pressuring the dentists into providing high-quality fillings. All of the
solutions are far removed from the dental chair. Consequently, the
theoretical dentist cartel could maintain supracompetitive profits.
Because procompetitive restraints are reasonable and reasonable
restraints are legal, determining the likelihood of quality collusion
requires answering a third question: “Does the alleged collusion cause
a cognizable net social harm?” If answered in the negative, it releases
from review those fledgling industries with a short track record that
might otherwise require scrutiny under the first factor. The question
is a threshold—if the harm is substantial enough to be reasonably
310. See MGEX, supra note 126.
311. Because the transaction does not involve price, changes in consumer utility
serve as a proxy to measure the change in value. In line with how the 1992
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES were applied, supra note 35, a theoretical 5%
change in consumer utility, without a corresponding change in output, would indicate
the potential for monopoly power. See supra note 147.
312. Courts must be careful not to commit the Cellophane Fallacy in answering
this question. See supra Part I.A.
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cognizable, then this factor is satisfied. Aside from the suggestions in
Part III.B, to answer this question courts can and should consider
whether the consumers or the firms are pressing for standardization.
If consumers are pressing for a standardized product, a socially
cognizable harm is less likely.313 Returning to the oral hygiene
market, if the lower quality filling material caused excess tooth decay,
there is obviously social cognizable harm. In comparison, if the
dentists pressed manufacturers to standardize the shape of the clips
used to fasten a patient’s bib to increase the dental hygienists’
efficiency, it would benefit consumers and therefore be unlikely to
cause a socially cognizable harm.
Members of the Community or society may fear the three-factor
test or framework is either over- or under-inclusive. Consumers want
an inclusive framework to avoid monopoly prices. Suppliers want to
avoid over-inclusion to have more flexibility to compete. The first
two questions ensure that the net is fine enough to catch
anticompetitive horizontal agreements on quality and protect
consumers. The final question protects firms from overzealous
enforcement. Although walking a fine line, retrospective studies,
discussed below, will enhance the accuracy of the framework over
time, and ensure it works in practice.

2.

The Three-Factor Test as Applied to the LBTN Market

Local Broadcast Television News stations entered into horizontal
agreements that coordinated their activities.314 This section applies
the three-factor test to the agreements’ information that is available
publicly.
Obviously, a more precise application could be
accomplished with more information.
The first factor is whether firms in the industry typically compete
on quality. Operating in a two-sided market, LBTN stations compete
for advertisers, necessitating a competition for viewers. The clearest
examples of inter-station competition are the prices stations pay for
exclusive content, such as the Super Bowl. The advertising rates
broadcasters can charge for spots during exclusive events makes the
station’s cost of the event worthwhile. If it were less clear, a court

313. When the Industrial Revolution was in its infancy, toolmakers, the bolt
consumers, pressed for standardization, and the result was an increase in
competition. William Sellers, The United States Standard Screw Threads (1864),
ASME, http://anniversary.asme.org/2005landmarks3.shtml (last visited Nov. 13,
2012).
314. See supra Part I.C.
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could look to whether the firms or the consumers were pressing for
standardization. The covert nature of many of the agreements makes
it clear that the agreements are for the stations’ benefit; were they for
the benefit of the public, the participants would tout them as
examples of customer appreciation.
The second factor is whether the market is susceptible to a
substantial change in quality without a reflexive change in demand.
The LNSA market is conducive to cartelization because supply and
demand are inelastic,315 allowing price increases to be profitable. The
market is concentrated, making agreements easier to reach.316 Lastly,
significant barriers to entry in the form of regulations317 and market
structure prevent new entrants from increasing competition.318 As a
result, demand cannot correct anticompetitive quality restrictions.
LNSAs naturally overcome the remaining hurdles cartels face. Once
LBTN stations come to an agreement and form a cartel, the rest falls
into place. LNSAs effectively force the identical output across
several firms,319 making cheating impossible and unnecessary. For
example, for a cartel member in Charleston, South Carolina, to
“cheat” it would both subsidize its competition and bear the full cost
of its unique content—making it financially unfeasible. The closest
that firms can get to cheating are marginal improvements in quality
such as anchor or set quality. Furthermore, even if cheating were
possible, the public nature of broadcast television allows instant
detection and nearly instant punishment by the cartel.
The final question is whether the collusion results in a socially
cognizable harm. LNSAs cause several. Judge Learned Hand
articulated the clearest harm in the context of news, when he
explained that “one of the most vital of all general interests [is] the
dissemination of news from as many different sources, and with as
many different facets and colors as is possible.”320 Because LNSAs
share scripts and restrict the number of unique stories, they
inherently have significantly fewer facets and colors.321 In keeping
with Judge Learned Hand’s statement, society is harmed.
Reinforcing the judge, the rationale for the Newspaper Preservation

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.C.
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 28 (1945).
See Yanich, supra note 1, at 25–27.
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Act of 1977322 acknowledges the importance of editorial diversity,
placing it above other antitrust concerns: newspapers received
antitrust immunity conditioned on maintaining editorial
independence. To ignore quality collusion in television broadcasting
while disallowing the same behavior in other media is hypocritical.
There is certainly enough evidence to support an investigation into
the negative impact SSAs have on quality in the market.
In sum, the LNSAs satisfy the three factors: the market typically
competes on the quality of programming; it is susceptible to
substantial changes in quality without reflexive changes in demand;
and the reduction in the news output is a cognizable social harm.
Accordingly, if LNSAs as they stand today were prosecuted, they
would be found illegal, barring other justifications or defenses.
Although these justifications are allowed, they are rarely successful.
To ensure the effectiveness of the factors it is important that the
Agencies study the results.
D. Conduct Retrospective Analyses of the Aforementioned
Strategies
Retrospective studies are possibly the most important and smallest
addition to federal antitrust policy of the proposed suggestions.
Economic theory, modeling, and analyses, which drive antitrust law,
are evolving and growing in sophistication and accuracy.323 Past
actions provide the best data available to determine the
appropriateness of future actions and retrospective studies will make
future economic models more accurate.324 Additional retrospective
studies could provide insight into cases brought by the Commission
and Division. While retrospective studies are completed on a limited
basis, additional analyses could enable the agencies to utilize their
resources more efficiently, curtail anticompetitive activity more
effectively, adjust their publications and guidelines, and promote
competitive behavior that the Agencies initially considered
anticompetitive.

322. 15 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006).
323. Compare United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377
(1956), with FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997). Unfortunately, it
may be impossible to perform thorough analysis in cases where the enforcement
action failed because much of the data will remain private.
324. Unfortunately, cases are decided without hindsight.
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Retrospective studies are not more prevalent, because they are
expensive and drain the Agencies’ resources325 in the short term, even
if they may produce long-term cost savings. Unfortunately, given that
the Agencies’ budgets are limited, they may need to shift resources
from current enforcement actions to retrospective studies that will
enhance future enforcement. It is unclear which path is more
efficient in the end.
Regarding the LBTN industry, the Agencies should look at former
media enforcement actions, litigated or not, such as Raycom and
News Corporation Limited with an eye on quality collusion.
Additionally, as the Agencies move forward, they should continue to
conduct retrospective studies to determine whether the original
remedies were effective or needed. To make the studies more
effective, the consent decrees may call for specific language that
requires the firms to provide the Agencies with certain information.
These studies could prove invaluable to determining the best course
of action going forward, increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of
federal antitrust laws, and thereby improving the quality of the news.
CONCLUSION
The status quo leaves the door wide open. Firms openly collude on
quality without fear, and broadcast stations collude, causing
significant social harm. The neglect likely stems from the difficulty in
measuring and the complex nature of quality restraints. These
justifications can only bend antitrust laws so far and in certain
markets. The justifications appear non-existent, while the social costs
remain high. In these markets, quality collusion requires closer
scrutiny. Unfortunately, the problems with quality collusion extend
beyond television, and the potential consequences can be more
severe. What if pharmaceutical companies decided that the drugs
they have developed to cure cancer were sufficient? What if they
agreed to fix quality at the current level? Quality collusion should be
pursued as vigorously as price collusion.
To enforce antitrust laws in accordance with their statutory
language, the Community needs to shift its stance. It must increase
enforcement to reduce quality collusion as it occurs and deter quality
collusion in the first place. The Community can develop strategies to
quantify quality, or use an industry’s metrics to prove the existence of
cognizable social harms in court. It can also institute a framework for
325. See supra notes 283–84 and accompanying text.
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courts to follow, such as the three-factor test advanced by this Note,
to streamline litigation and work towards eliminating quality
collusion. These changes will allow courts to provide relief from the
cost our society pays for collusion.

